The Claim Security models that rely on trusted delivery infrastructure assume that software served from legitimate domains retains its integrity over time. When distribution channels become the attack surface, that assumption collapses. Zero Trust for Code addresses this by verifying the integrity and intent of executed code regardless of its delivery source, ensuring that trust […]
The Claim Trust in community-maintained software ecosystems are becoming increasingly fragile when ownership, update control, and build processes can be altered without continuous verification. Security models that rely on repository reputation or maintainer identity, fail to account for silent trust transitions. Zero Trust for Code addresses this by enforcing integrity and behavior validation at execution, […]
Enterprise security has a foundational assumption that if we can recognize malicious software quickly enough, we can stop it. The Detection Model Assumes Reuse Signature-based and reputation-based systems need prior observation to function. They require an artifact to match something already catalogued: the same hash, the same behavioral fingerprint, the same infrastructure. Even modern behavioral […]
The Claim Applications that pass platform verification, code signing, and distribution checks are still capable of executing unauthorized and evolving behavior at runtime. Trust based on validation at install time is no longer sufficient to ensure safe execution. Zero Trust for Code addresses this by enforcing what software is allowed to do after it is […]
The Claim Trusted developers and maintainers are now a primary attack surface. When access to a legitimate developer account enables malicious code through established software ecosystems, trust decisions are compromised before execution even begins. Zero Trust for Code addresses this by validating not just how code behaves at runtime, but whether its origin, build context, […]
CrowdStrike and Google’s Glassworm takedown is a genuine win. Two years of coordinated supply chain attacks, 300+ poisoned GitHub repositories, four command-and-control channels knocked offline. Real work, real results, and the teams involved deserve the credit. Here’s what the story also reveals, though. The Glassworm attackers didn’t break encryption or exploit a zero-day. They hijacked […]
The Claim The emergence of no-code malware platforms demonstrates that trust based on code origin, developer identity, or distribution channel is no longer sufficient. As malware creation becomes more accessible and scalable, Zero Trust for Code is required to enforce what software is permitted to do at execution time, independent of how it was built […]
The Claim A compromised GitHub token granted unauthorized access to Grafana’s private code repositories, where attackers then download source code and attempt extortion. Traditional code validated access, but failed to control what that access allowed. Zero Trust for Code helps by enforcing what actions are permitted inside development environments and CI/CD pipelines. The Threat Grafana […]
The Claim AI agents are now capable of dynamically generating custom hacking tools and scripts during an active intrusion, allowing attackers to bypass traditional detection methods that rely on known signatures. Zero Trust for Code addresses this by enforcing what code and actions are permitted to execute, regardless of how they are generated. The Threat […]
The Claim An AI system produced a zero-day exploit that bypassed 2FA on a widely deployed admin platform. Identity analysis verified the actor but did not constrain the action. Zero Trust for Code closes the gap by enforcing what a system is allowed to do after authentication, not just whether access is granted. The Threat […]
The Claim A routine, authenticated git push should not trigger backend code execution. In this case, it did. Identity was valid, access was expected, and the platform functioned as designed but trusted operations produced an unauthorized outcome. Zero Trust for Code closes this gap by governing what is allowed after code enters the pipeline, not […]
The Claim Modern software security still assumes that trusted code behaves safely once it enters the system. That assumption no longer holds. Code can arrive through legitimate pipelines, with verified provenance, and still execute actions that exceed intended system behavior. Zero Trust for Code closes this gap by enforcing what software is allowed to do […]
